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ABSTRACT
Old-style Keynesian models relied on sticky prices or wages to explain
unemployment and to argue for demand-side macroeconomic policies. This
approach relied increasingly on a Phillips-curve view of the world, and
therefore lost considerable prestige with the events of the 1970s. The new
classical macroeconomics began at about that time, and focused initially on
the apparent real effects of monetary disturbances. Despite initial
successes, this analysis ultimately was unsatisfactory as an explanation for
an important role of money in business fluctuations. Nevertheless, the
approach achieved important methodological advances, such as rational
expectations and new methods of policy evaluation. Subsequent research by
new classicals has deemphasized monetary shocks, and focused instead on real
business cycle models and theories of endogenous economic growth. These
areas appear promising at this time. Another development is the so-called
new Keynesian economics, which includes long-term contracts, menu costs,
efficiency wages and insider-outsider theories, and macroeconomic models with
imperfect competition. Although some of these ideas may prove helpful as
elements in real business cycle models, my main conclusion is that the new
Keynesian economics has not been successful in rehabilitating the Keynesian
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When I was a graduate student at Harvard in the late 1960s, the Keynesian
model was the only game in town as far as macroeconomics was concerned.
Therefore, while I had doubts about the underpinnings of this analysis, it
seemed worthwhile to work within the established framework to develop a model
that was logically more consistent and hopefully empirically more useful.
Collaborating with Herschel Grossman (Barro and Grossman, 1971), we made some
progress in clarifying and extending the Keynesian model. But that research
also made obvious the dependence of the central results on fragile underlying
assumptions. The model stressed the failure of private enterprise economies
to ensure full employment and production, and the consequent role for active
macro policies as instruments to improve outcomes. Shocks to aggregate
demand--but not aggregate supply--were the key to business fluctuations, and
mere changes in optimism or pessimism turned out to be self fulfilling.
These properties, which seem odd to economists who think in terms of price
theory and well-functioning private markets, suggest coordination problems on
a grand scale. But this perspective hardly accords with the basic source of
market failure that characterizes the standard Keynesian model. It is the
mere stickiness of prices or wages, primarily in the downward direction, that
accounts for the principal results. Of course, many macroeconomists think of
price stickiness as an "as if" device--a problem that is not to be viewed
literally, but instead as a proxy for serious matters, such as incomplete
information, adjustment costs, and other problems of coordination among
economic agents. But this viewpoint has not been borne out by subsequent
research. For example, the incorporation of these serious matters does not2
support the Keynesian stress on aggregate demand, and also does not provide a
normative basis for activist government policies of the usual Keynesian type.
One important function of a macroeconomic model is to isolate the sources
of disturbances that cause aggregate business fluctuations. Keynesian
analyses focus on shocks to aggregate demand, and typically attribute these
shocks either to governmental actions (disruptive or corrective fiscal and
monetary policies), or to shifts in private preferences that influence
consumption or investment demand. Keynes's own discussion (Keynes, 1935,
chapter 12) referred to the "animal spirits" of businessmen, and the
consequent volatility of investment demand due to shifting moods of optimism
or pessimism. Thus, aside from governmental actions, the Keynesian model is
not strong at pinpointing observable, objective events that cause recessions
or booms.
One reason that Keynes may not have been troubled by this "deficiency" is
that he viewed the private economy as inherently unstable. It did not take
large (and presumably objectively observable) shocks to trigger a recession,
because even a small shock--when -interacting with the multiplier (and, in
some models, also the investment accelerator)--could generate a significant
and sustained drop in output and employment. Curiously, however, later
Keynesian developments deemphasized the multiplier. For example, in the
well-known IS/UI model (in which interest rates adjust and matter for
aggregate demand) or in Keynesian analyses that incorporate some version of
the permanent-income hypothesis, multipliers need not exist. These
extensions do improve the model's fit with some facts about business cycles,
such as the apparent absence of a multiplicative response of output to
changes in government purchases and the relative stability of consumption3
over the business cycle. But the elimination of the multiplier means also
that large responses of output, as in a substantial recession, require large
impulses; hence, it again becomes important to identify the kinds of shocks
that typically matter for aggregate fluctuations.
I think that the desire to find observable, aggregate shocks motivated
many Keynesians- -althoughnot Keynes nor many of his immediate followers- -to
assign a substantial weight to monetary disturbances as a source of the
business cycle. Within a framework where prices adjust slowly and output is
determined by aggregate demand, it is easy to conclude that an increase in
money raises output and also leads gradually to a higher price level.
Moreover, the positive correlation between money and output- -andperhaps
between the price level and output- -showedup in some data.
During the 1960s and early l970s, Keynesian analysis became increasingly
identified with this Phillips curve-view of the world. Thus, this analysis
also lost considerable prestige when the Phillips curve disappeared in the
mid l970s; the rise in unemployment along with the increasing rate of
inflation was difficult to explain in this kind of model. New Keynesians
have, however, demonstrated their flexibility by arguing that the old
Keynesian model merely need to be patched up to incorporate the supply side.
But this argument does not work. In a single market, one can think of
quantity as determined by demand with the excess supply rationed--as in the
Keynesian model- -sothat changes in quantity depend only on shocks to demand.
Then if this situation applies to the majority of markets, one can generate
orthodox Keynesian prescriptions for demand-oriented governmental policies.
Alternatively, quantity in a typical market could be determined by supply
with the excess demand rationed- -asin markets subject to effective price4
controls-- so that movements in quantity depend only on shocks to supply. If
this situation holds for the majority of markets, one again gets
prescriptions for the government's macro policies, but they are basically
opposite to those from the Keynesian model. The serious alternative to
either of these two polar cases is a framework where demand and supply are
somehow balanced or equilibrated on the various markets. Although I regard
this equilibrium approach as the logical way to think about macroeconomics,
this approach--pursued by new classical macroeconomists--turns out to be
inconsistent with basic Keynesian themes.
The New Classical Aporoach
The new classical macroeconomics, sometimes referred to as rational
expectations macroeconomics or as the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics,
began with Bob Lucas's research (Lucas, 1972, 1976) in the early 1970s. A
guiding discipline of this work was that economic agents acted rationally in
the context of their environment; notably that people assembled and used
information in an efficient manner. Although the approach stressed fully
worked out equilibrium theories, the analysis was directed at explaining
real-world business fluctuations. The basic viewpoint implied that it would
be unsatisfactory to "explain" these fluctuations by easily correctable
market failures, such as those present in Keynesian models. Hence
fluctuations had to reflect real or monetary disturbances, whose dynamic
economic effects depended on costs of obtaining information, costs of
adjustment, and so on.
The biggest challenge to the new classical approach was to explain why
money was non-neutral, and, in particular, why monetary disturbances played a5
major role in business cycles. This area was a significant challenge because
first, it seemed to be empirically important, and second, the equilibrium
framework with flexible prices tends to generate a close approximation to
monetary neutrality.
Initially, the approach seemed to achieve notable successes. On a
theoretical level, short-term real effects of monetary disturbances could
arise from imperfect information about money and the general price level.
Monetary shocks, which affected the general price level in the same
direction, could be temporarily misperceived as shifts in relative prices,
which led to adjustments in the supply of labor and other quantities. These
real effects vanished in the long run, but could persist for awhile because
of information lags and costs of adjusting the quantities of factor inputs.
On the other hand, anticipated monetary changes-- which include systematic
monetary policies--would not matter because they did not lead to
informational confusions (Sargent and Wallace, 1975).
On an empirical level, there was also evidence that appeared to support
the approach. Monetary disturbances seemed to be important sources of
business fluctuations, and there was some indication that it was mainly the
unanticipated or surprise part of monetary movements that mattered for real
variables (Barro, 1981). Some cross-country evidence supported the
theoretical predictions concerning the relation between the volatility of
money and the slopes of estimated Phillips curves (Kormendi and Meguire,
1984). The theory was also consistent with the observed absence of a
substantial long-term relationship between real economic performance and the
growth rates of money and prices; that is, with the absence of a long-run
Phillips curve.6
Further investigations cast doubt on these successes. First, the
informational lag in observing money and the general price level did not seem
to be very important. If incomplete information about money and the general
price level mattered a lot for economic decisions, people could expend
relatively little effort to find out quickly about these variables. Second,
the theory did not do so well in terms of its predictions about monetary
effects on real interest rates, real wage rates, and consumption. Third, the
predicted Phillips curve-type relation between price surprises and real
economic activity basically disappeared after the early 1970s. Fourth, the
positive relation between monetary shocks and output shows up most clearly
with broad monetary aggregates. The relation with narrow aggregates, such as
the monetary base, is much weaker.
The upshot of these arguments is that the new classical approach does not
do very well in accounting for an important role of money in business
fluctuations. However, this failing may not be so serious because the
empirical evidence on the causal role of money for real variables seems also
to have been overstated. In other words, the accounting for major short-run
non-neutralities of money was a misplaced priority for the new classical
approach. Some empirical evidence supports this conclusion; for example, the
observation that the correlation of real economic activity with broad
monetary aggregates is greater than that with the monetary base or the price
level, or the finding that real effects from the quantity of money are weak
once the behavior of nominal interest rates is held constant. These results
suggest that endogenous responses of money- -partlyfrom the behavior of
policymakers and partly from the workings of the financial system--may7
account for most of the correlations between money and real economic
activity.
This verdict does not invalidate some of the major successes of the new
classical approach. In terms of methodology, these successes include the
application of equilibrium modeling to macroeconomic analysis, the use of
rational expectations as part of this modeling, and the revolution in
approaches to policy evaluation. One specific application in which the
equilibrium approach has achieved some success is in analyses of fiscal
policy (see Barro, 1989b, for a survey). Some of this research revolves
around the Ricardian equivalence theorem, which provides conditions under
which substitutions of budget deficits for taxes are of no consequence.' But
further developments have brought out the real effects from government
purchases and public services, the composition and timing of distorting
taxes, and so on.
Another interesting off-shoot from the new classical approach is the
application of game theory to the interaction between government policymakers
and the private sector. The results here involve the distinction between
rules and discretion, and the related roles of commitment, credibility, and
reputation (see, Rogoff, 1989, for a survey). Some of the early analyses in
this area dealt with monetary models; specifically, with the Phillips curve
and the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. But subsequent
applications, such as to tax and regulatory policies and to international
debt, do not rely on an important role for money in business fluctuations.
iBartley (1989) claims more than I ever would by describin Ricardian
equivalence as "an Exocet aimed at the heart of the Keynesian notion that
deficits stimulate the economy."8
Real Business Qy Theory
With the deemphasis on monetary models of the business cycle, most
proponents of the new classical approach have moved over the last five to ten
years to analyses that rely on real disturbances as sources of business
fluctuations (see Kydland and Prescott, 1982, and the survey by McCallum,
1989). These models stress technology shocks or other disturbances to the
supply side as central driving forces, but allow an important role for the
dynamic elements that influence the ways that shocks propagate. The models
are equilibrium in style, featuring cleared, competitive markets; optimizing
agents who are typically modeled as representative households with infinite
horizons; and neoclassical production functions that are subject to
stochastic disturbances. Although the models deemphasize monetary shocks,
the analysis of propagation mechanisms would apply as much to monetary models
as to real models. In the real business cycle (or RBC) framework, any
positive correlation between output and money reflects the endogenous
response of monetary aggregates (see King and Plosser, 1984).
A number of authors have simulated versions of RBC models on U.S. data,
where the underlying parameters of preferences and technology are calibrated
to be consistent with findings from cross-sectional studies. In many
respects the results accord with observed characteristics of business cycles.
For example, RBC models can get right the relative variances of consumption,
investment, capital stocks, and worker hours; and also account for the
procyclical behavior of these variables. However, the models tend to
overstate the procyclical patterns of hours, productivity, real interest
rates, and real wage rates. In addition, to explain the standard deviation
of output growth, the models require a standard deviation for technological9
disturbances that may be excessive. However, so far, such judgments are
based solely on introspection.
To explain recessions within the RBC framework, one has to admit
technological or other supply-side disturbances that are adverse as well as
favorable. Some critics have argued that technological regress is impossible
(although I noted recently the possibility that the gun turret on the U.S.
battleship Iowa could not be repaired because the expertise in this area had
been lost). Other events that amount to negative shocks to production
conditions are cartelization of markets (as with OPEC and perhaps with
European style labor unions), harvest failures, strikes, and--for a single
country- -unfavorablemovements in the terms of trade. It is also likely that
a collapse of the financial and credit system--as in the United States during
the Great Depression-- can be viewed as an adverse real shock (see Bernanke,
1983). However, it would be desirable to have a theoretical model that could
explain financial collapses as an endogenous response to government policies
and other developments.
Early versions of ItBC models exhibit Pareto-optimal behavior, and thereby
show that observed fluctuations in aggregate business activity are
insufficient reason for advocating governmental intervention in the form of
stabilization policies. Adverse shocks and recessions are unfortunate in
these models; it is just that the government cannot improve matters. RBC
models can be extended to include external effects, such as those implied by
public goods and taxation. The models are then well suited to incorporate
supply-side, incentive effects from taxation, regulation, transfer programs,
and so on. In this setting the outcomes are generally not Pareto optimal,
and- -subjectto the usual problems of public choice- -theremay be useful10
roles for government policy. But the distortions that underlie these results
are of the classical, excessburden variety, rather than the Keynesian
type--that is, they involve "triangles instead of "gaps.' Consequently,
desirable policy in these models gets more from public finance theory than
from traditional macroeconomics.
Overall, the real-business-cycle area has generated many new insights and
techniques that assist in modeling the macroeconomy and in thinking about
government policies. But it is not yet clear how much the models contribute
toward understanding actual business cycles, or to the construction of
policies that governments might wish to implement.
Endogenous Growth Models
Another recent development, which is consistent methodologically with
real-business-cycle theory, concerns models of endogenous economic growth
(see, Romer, 1989, for a survey). Unlike the predecessors of the Solow
(1956)-Koopmans (1965)-Cass (1965) type, these new models generate long-run
growth within the models, and therefore can relate long-term differences in
growth rates to underlying parameters of technology, preferences, and
government policy. There are two major strands of this literature. One
strand features constant returns to a broad concept of reproducible capital,
which includes human capital and perhaps even the number of persons (see
Rebelo, 1987). With this type of constant returns, the long-term growth
rate, which is intimately related to the saving rate, is determined by
productivity and time preference. It is also possible to determine
population growth along with growth per capita. Because there are no
underlying externalities, the decentralized choices of growth and saving tend11
to be Pareto optimal. However, as in the RBC context, some extended versions
of these growth models allow for a role of government by introducing public
services and taxation (see Barro, 1989a). Then the usual public-finance
choices arise, and these choices interact with the determination of growth
and saving. One major theme is that governmental provision of infrastructure
services and the protection of property rights can be especially important in
fostering private saving and economic growth.
The second strand of the endogenous growth literature, identified
especially with Romer (1986), brings in spillover effects that involve the
creation of knowledge. At the level of an individual firm, production may be
subject to diminishing returns. However, because some advances in techniques
and information also benefit other firms, returns at a social level may be
constant or even increasing. Similar effects can arise with the accumulation
of human capital if the value of one person's stock of capital is benefited
by the accumulation of human capital by others. Two major implications from
these models are first, long-term per capita growth is sustainable and can be
explained by the underlying structural elements of the model, and second,
because social returns to research and perhaps the accumulation of human
capital exceed the private returns, the decentralized choices of growth and
saving tend to be too low from a social perspective. Thus, the analysis has
implications for positive analyses of differences in growth and saving rates
across countries, and also for the design of government policies. The
obvious policy implications relate to subsidies for research and development,
although additional results apply to education spending, restrictions on free
trade, immigration regulations, and so on.12
After a lapse of serious interest for about 20 years, the field of
economic growth is once again exciting. The initial impetus came from some
theoretical breakthroughs, but the attention is now turning to empirical
analyses of the determinants of growth and saving across countries and over
time. In order for the interest to be sustained--as it was not in the
earlier period- -Ibelieve that success at the empirical level will be
crucial. Since differences in long-term growth rates have such a dramatic
effect on levels of welfare, the success of this type of empirical work is
obviously of more than academic interest.
New Keynesian Models
According to a newspaper article that I read from Australia there is now
a consensus among economists that a successful Keynesian revival is underway.
(Unfortunately, the reporter neglected to mention that the consensus was
acclaimed at a meeting of the Australian Economics Conference, where only
Keynesians had been invited to attend.) No less than four new areas (the
four horsemen of the new Keynesian economics?) are actively being pursued to
provide Keynesian analysis with firm microeconomic underpinnings. Looked at
this way, the mission of the new Keynesian economics (which I like to
describe by the acronym NUKE) is peculiar. Instead of providing new
theoretical results and hypotheses for empirical testing, the objective often
seems to be to provide respectability for the basic viewpoint and policy
prescriptions that characterize the old Keynesian models. It may well be
more rewarding to look instead for new theoretical insights, empirical
hypotheses, and policy implications.13
The first NUKE area- -implicitor explicit long- term contracts for labor
or goods-- is intended to rationalize sticky wages or prices. Although these
models may explain why some wages or prices are sticky, the approach has been
less successful in relating this stickiness to Keynesian style behavior of
employment and output. Basically, the introduction of an ability to
undertake long-term contracts tends to make private markets function more
efficiently, rather than less efficiently as in the Keynesian model. If the
basic problem in business fluctuations is an inability of agents to
coordinate decisions, then it would indeed be surprising if this problem
originated from an ability to make contracts.
As an example, in the context of a long-term labor agreement, it is
possible to attain the appropriate variations over time in work effort
without requiring day-to-day adjustments in pay. yorkers agree at the
outset- -eitherformally or informally- -thatthey will expend more effort when
there is more work to do, with the understanding that they will also receive
more leisure when there is less work (see Barro, 1977, and Hall and Lilien,
1979). As long as the variations in effort are not too great or
long-lasting, it is unnecessary for wages to rise along with the extra work
and vice versa. Thus, this analysis explains why the private economy can
behave efficiently- -asif markets cleared continuously- -evenif observed
wages are sticky. The underlying shadow value of time is flexible,and the
observed wages are merely installment payments that are part of a broader
compensation package. Thus, in this view, it is also not surprising or
disturbing if observed real wages do not correlate especially well with
variations in labor supply. (There are some differences here in the
predictions for movements in hours or effort from existing employees versus14
changes in the number of workers, because new employees are likely not
covered by previous labor contracts.)
Another point is that long-term contracting is an element of a real
theory, and does not explain why monetary disturbances or the Phillips curve
would be important. Moreover, it is just as likely that the real wages or
relative prices determined in a long-term agreement would be "too low" as
"too high." Thus, the implications for excess supply or demand are
symmetric, and do not tend to support the Keynesian focus on aggregate
demand.
The second area of the new Keynesian economics allows for menu costs in
the adjustment of prices or wages (see Ball, Mankiw, and Romer, 1988, for a
survey). Unlike long-term contracts, the idea here is that nominal prices
are costly to change--thus, this theory does relate to monetary disturbances
and to the interplay between nominal and real variables. In the absence of
long-term contracts (as above), the "errors" in price formation could
translateS into inefficient choices of quantities. However, as with long-term
contracts, this viewpoint does not point especially to the Keynesian case
where nominal prices are too high rather than too low. That is, Keynesian
excess supply would be no more likely than sustained excess demand.
As a theoretical matter, it has long been known that direct costs of
adjustment could explain some stickiness in prices. However, the basic
misgiving about menu costs is that the direct costs of adjusting prices are
typically trivial relative to the losses from choosing inappropriate
quantities. (The costs for changing prices tend also to be much less
significant than those for changing quantities.) Thus, the main contribution
of the new literature on menu costs was to show that- -startingfrom a15
position of market clearing--an error in price setting could involve costs
that are second order privately but first order socially. (Under imperfect
competition, the "market-clearing" price could also be allowed to deviate
from marginal cost.) Unfortunately, this result does not hold if output and
employment are already finite amounts away from their equilibrium values. In
this situation, the private cost from setting a price a little further from
its market-clearing value is also first order. Thus, if the costs of price
adjustment are minor, this approach still fails to explain significant
shortfalls in production and employment. New classical models with money
were often criticized for their reliance on faulty perceptions about the
general price level to explain major recessions. Since it was cheap to learn
about the general price level, the overall analysis was unconvincing. But it
is even more unconvincing to argue that major contractions of output and
employment arise because firms are unwilling to pay the small menu costs
required to change their prices.
The third NUKE area, efficiency wages, starts from the reasonable view
that the terms of a labor compensation package can affect workers' incentives
to provide effort. For example, the more attractive a job and the less
attractive is unemployment, the more willing someone is to work to avoid
being fired. (Marx also had this idea in his reserve-army model.) These
features can be incorporated as influences on labor supply in real business
cycle models (Danthine and Donaldson, 1988); an extension that is
straightforward because efficiency-wage theory applies to real variables
rather than to monetary forces. However, the incorporation of the
efficiency-wage idea tends to exacerbate one of the shortcomings of RBC
models. Namely (at least in the absence of long-term labor contracts), the16
predicted pattern for real wages turns out, counterfactually, to be even more
procyclical.
Instead of proceeding by introducing efficiency wages into an equilibrium
model and then evaluating the empirical implications, most proponents of this
approach have focused on the theoretical possibilities for generating
Keynesian style "involuntary unemployment" (see, for example, Akerlof, 1984,
andShapiroand Stiglitz, 1984). Carmichael (1985) showed that this approach
depended on some missing prices; that is, attractive jobs were effectively
not sold up front. Even if job seekers have little access to credit markets
or are worried about exploitation from employers, this process would work to
clear the market; that is, to eliminate queues. Thus, to avoid this
straightforward elimination of involuntary unemployment, one has to assume
that the market for new jobs does not function or that the prices paid for
jobs are exogenously sticky. In effect then, the efficiency-wage theory of
unemployment is another example of old-style Keynesian theories in which some
prices are arbitrarily treated as rigid. Other critics of efficiency-wage
theories have noted that bonding and monitoring on the job can substitute for
high wages as incentive mechanisms (see Katz, 1986). Also, if efficiency
wages are important only on some jobs, there is another reason why the
approach cannot account for involuntary unemployment (although it still may
be significant in modifying the properties of a well specified equilibrium
model).
Another area that is sometimes mentioned along with efficiency-wage
theories is the i,isider-oulsider model of the labor market (Lindbeck and
Snower, 1988). This approach shows how insiders can effectively obtain a
monopoly position over labor allocations. Thereby the determination of17
employment and output can be Pareto inefficient. Moreover, the process
sometimes leads to a high degree of persistence in unemployment, which is
often discussed under the heading of hystereszs (Blanchard and Summers,
1987). In many ways this analysis is similar to the treatment of imperfect
competition in the product market, which is the topic discussed next.
The last of the four main areas of the new Keynesian economics concerns
models of business fluctuations that include imperfect competition with some
elements of increasing returns (see, for example, Hall, 1988). As with
efficiency wages, imperfect competition is a purely real theory that could be
incorporated into real business cycle models. Aspects of imperfect
competition are, in fact, central to some endogenous growth models. Although
the results on fluctuations and growth under imperfect competition tend not
to be Pareto efficient (as is also true in the presence of distorting
taxation or public goods), there is no reason to think that the findings
would support Keynesian arguments for aggregate demand policies. In any
case, the important challenge is to show why the incorporation of aspects of
imperfect competition leads to model characteristics that accord better with
empirical evidence on business fluctuations. This demonstration has not yet
been made, and one reason to be skeptical is that the approach does not
identify any new elements as sources of fluctuations. (It also does not seem
to lead to multipliers, which might lessen the need to identify sources of
shocks.) Presumably, cyclical variations in the degree of monopoly are not
the key to the business cycle.
Some of the ideas in the new Keynesian models, such as incentive
mechanisms for labor effort and imperfect competition, may turn out to be
useful for understanding the macroeconomy. But it is hard to see how these18
ideas constitute a well-defined area of research that will actually
rehabilitate Keynesian analysis. At this point, I fear that the Australian
journalist's perception of an emerging consensus in macroeconomics is very
far from the truth. Macroeconomic research seems to be evolving into two
camps: could it be the good guys versus the badguys?19
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